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I. INTRODUCTION.
Insider trading cases against legal and financial professionals
tend to be hotly litigated disputes over factual rather than legal
issues. Defending these cases requires a persuasive, slanted
presentation that explains in a consistent and credible manner the
defendant’s conduct and transactions and supports the defendant’s
good faith in the face of what is ordinarily a multi-layered but
exclusively circumstantial case that the defendant engaged in
fraudulent and deceptive securities transactions.
II. BACKGROUND.
A. The Development of Insider Trading Liability.
Insider trading liability may arise in the context of criminal,
civil or administrative proceedings. The U.S. Department of Justice
has jurisdiction to pursue criminal actions. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), self-regulatory agencies, and state
securities enforcement agencies may initiate civil and
administrative proceedings based on insider trading allegations.
Private parties may also bring civil claims based on insider trading
allegations.
Insider trading claims are frequently pursued against classic
insiders - officers and directors of corporations, who in the regular
course of their duties have access to material, nonpublic
information. Professionals assisting those corporations, officers
and directors—lawyers, investment bankers and other financial
advisors—frequently have access to this same information in the
normal course of providing professional services. Indeed, it is not
surprising that many insider trading claims are brought against
these professionals, who are sometimes characterized as “temporary
1
insiders” by virtue of their temporary access to inside information.
1. The Traditional or Classical Theory.
Insider trading liability is ordinarily based on a violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-

1. See Robert S. Karmel, Insider Trading: Law, Policy and Theory after O’Hagan,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 84 n.6 (1998) (“Attorneys, more than any other group,
have been prosecuted for insider trading.”). Id.
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2

5 thereunder. Liability for trading on inside information is usually
premised on Rule 10b-5’s ban on fraudulent acts or practices.
“Under the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical’ theory of insider trading . . .
Rule 10b-5 [is] violated when a corporate insider trades in [that
corporation’s securities] on the basis of material, nonpublic
3
information.”
Initially, the prohibition against insider trading was articulated
as a “disclose or abstain” rule. This rule required a corporate
insider with a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders
to either disclose material, inside information or abstain from
trading in the corporation’s stock. That rule was first stated in
4
Cady, Roberts & Co., where the SEC found a director of a company
passing on an inside tip had violated the obligation to “disclose or
abstain.” In that case, the director, who was also a broker,
recommended that his customers sell the company’s stock based on
a tip from a corporate insider of a dividend cut. The SEC noted
the existence of a relationship allowing access to inside information
intended only for a legitimate corporate purpose, and the
unfairness of permitting an insider to take advantage of that
5
information by trading without disclosure. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court,
6
subsequently endorsed this “disclose or abstain” rule.
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently found that, in a face-toface transaction, a buyer with inside information about a company
has a duty to disclose such information to the seller before
7
consummating a transaction.
At least initially, the scope of insider trading liability was fairly
limited, and only applicable in situations where the insider had a
fiduciary duty to the party with whom the insider traded, or to the
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2001); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). Insider
trading liability under federal securities law may also be predicated on section
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14e-3 thereunder
(concerning tender offers), and Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(concerning short-swing profits). Insider trading liability may also arise from
violation of state blue sky laws.
3. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
4. Cady, Roberts & Co., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 346668, 40 SEC 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
5. Id. at 917-918.
6. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-227 (1980); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
7. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53
(1972).
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corporation, or shareholders of the corporation, whose securities
were traded. That is, absent a fiduciary relationship, trading on
material, non-public information did not create insider trading
liability.
The Supreme Court first examined this requirement of a
fiduciary relationship in an insider trading case in Chiarella v.
8
United States. In that case, a printing firm was hired to produce
9
The target company’s
documents for various tender offers.
10
identity was concealed in the galleys.
Chiarella, a printer
employed by the firm, was able to identify the target company by
reading the other information in the tender offer materials, and he
11
proceeded to purchase the target company’s stock. The Court
found Chiarella had no legal duty to the target company, absent a
wrongful conversion or misappropriation, and therefore did not
12
violate the insider trading laws. Significantly, the Court expressly
did not determine whether Chiarella breached a duty to his
13
employer, the printer.
Generally, a public company is not required to promptly
14
disclose all material corporate developments. Moreover, as the
Chiarella Court recognized, there is no general ban on trading on
15
non-public information, even without disclosure. For example,
brokers and their clients can trade on the basis of lawfully obtained
non-public information, and this information advantage is thought
16
to contribute to an efficient market.
The “disclose or abstain” rule was subsequently extended to
third party “tippees” - individuals who trade based on tips from
17
insiders. In Dirks v. SEC, the Court held that a tippee violates Rule
10b-5 when the insider who disclosed this information did so in
violation of the insider’s fiduciary duty to the company or its
18
shareholders.
In this case, Dirks, an investment analyst,
investigated a company and determined that the company’s assets

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 235-37.
Karmel, supra note 1, at 119.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234 n.16.
See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 660.
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19

had been fraudulently inflated.
He disclosed this to the Wall
Street Journal, which refused to publish, but word spread to
20
The stock fell more than $10 during a two-week
investors.
21
period. The Court found that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty
to . . . shareholders of a corporation . . . when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders” and “the tippee
22
knows or should know that there has been a breach.”
In an oft-cited footnote, the Court also said:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter,
accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of
the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary
duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but rather that they have entered
into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes . . . . For such a
duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect
the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information
confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such
23
a duty.
The Court emphasized, however, that a fiduciary duty arises
not merely when such persons have acquired material, nonpublic
information, but because they have entered into a special,
confidential relationship and are provided access to information
24
solely for legitimate corporate purposes.
In sum, these cases recognize that a fiduciary relationship
arises between a corporate insider and the corporation and its
shareholders, as a result of the insider’s employment as an officer
or director for the corporation. Under these circumstances, an
insider with material, non-public information has the obligation
either to disclose the information, or abstain from trading in the
corporation’s securities.
Professionals who obtain such
information from insiders in the regular course of their
employment, and tippees with knowledge that the insider tipper
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 649-50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 655 n.14 (citations omitted).
Id. at 654.
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has breached a fiduciary duty to the corporation by passing on
inside information, have the same obligations as insiders under this
rule.
2. The Misappropriation Theory.
The traditional or classical theory of insider trading liability
does not encompass circumstances where a person who is not a
corporate insider (and furthermore, not a tippee or a professional
who obtains the information while providing professional services
to the corporation) trades the corporation’s securities on the basis
of material, nonpublic information obtained in a manner that did
not involve an insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty. The “disclose or
abstain” rule does not apply to situations where the trader obtains
the information from sources other than the corporation whose
securities are traded, or where there is no breach of a fiduciary duty
to that corporation.
Because of this limitation, aggressive prosecutors and
regulators sought to expand the scope of insider trading liability to
situations where the trader obtained material, non-public
information by breaching a fiduciary duty other than a duty owed
to the corporation whose securities are traded. This broader
theory of insider trading liability—called “the misappropriation
theory”—bars trading by an insider even when the securities being
traded are not those of the insider’s employer. Under this theory,
a person violates Rule 10b-5 by misappropriating someone else’s
information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the
information (rather than the company whose stock is being
traded).
The misappropriation theory departs significantly from the
narrow “disclose or abstain” rule. Under this rule, fraud consists of
the deception inherent in a securities transaction where the insider
conceals important information from the other party to the
transaction. The focus is on the relationship between the insider
and the other trader. The misappropriation theory, by contrast,
does not restrict itself to the fraud perpetrated on those who buy
from or sell to the inside trader. Instead, it broadens the inquiry to
determine whether the “insider” has obtained the material, nonpublic information wrongfully - in breach of a duty owed to the
source of the information.
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25

For example, in United States v. Elliott, Elliot, a former law firm
partner, was successfully prosecuted based on the misappropriation
26
theory. Elliott learned confidential non-public information about
the planned acquisition of a large block of stock and subsequently
27
The government
purchased stock in the target company.
28
proceeded under the misappropriation theory.
The court
adopted the theory, finding that the statute’s language was broad
29
enough to cover misappropriation as a violation of section 10(b).
The court characterized attorneys as “quasi-insiders,” and found a
fiduciary relationship between the shareholders of a corporation
and the corporation’s lawyer when corporate information is
30
revealed legitimately and solely for corporate purposes.
The
court noted that, before a fiduciary duty can be deemed to exist,
“the corporation must expect the [attorney] to keep the disclosed
nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship . . . must
31
imply such a duty.”
32
As a further example, in SEC v. Willis, a psychiatrist tipped his
33
broker some inside information he had received from a patient.
With this inside information, the broker tipped friends and traded
34
The Court rejected the
in the accounts of several customers.
broker’s motion to dismiss, finding that the broker knew or was
reckless in not knowing that the information had been
misappropriated in breach of the psychiatrist’s duty to his patient,
and it was irrelevant for purposes of establishing insider trading
liability that the patient was not herself a party to the securities
35
transaction.
25. 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
26. Id. at 432.
27. Id. at 425-26.
28. Id. at 430.
29. Id. at 431-32.
30. Id. at 432.
31. Id.
32. 777 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
33. Id. at 1168.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1172. See also United States v. Falcone, 97 F. Supp. 2d 297 (E.D.N.Y.
2000). In Falcone, a securities broker profited from stock information received
from the friend of a business magazine’s employee. Id. at 300. The employee had
access to a business magazine containing information and advice about publicly
held companies. Id. The employee gained access to the magazine prior to public
dissemination. Id. The broker was found guilty despite the lack of a clear
fiduciary duty between the broker and tipper. Id. at 301-02; See also SEC v. Singer,
786 F. Supp. 1158, 1161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining how lawyer used
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Tippees who receive misappropriated information may be
liable for insider trading under the misappropriation theory even if
the tipper - the provider of the misappropriated information - did
not trade on that information. Tippee liability is imposed upon
proof of “a breach by the tipper of a duty owed to the owner of the
material nonpublic information and the tippee’s knowledge that
36
the tipper had breached the duty.”
The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the misappropriation
37
theory for the first time in United States v. O’Hagan. In that case,
O’Hagan was an attorney whose firm was retained by Grand
Metropolitan PLC in connection with a proposed acquisition of the
38
Before Grand Metropolitan publicly
Pillsbury Company.
announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock, O’Hagan purchased
2,500 Pillsbury call option contracts and approximately 5,000
39
shares of Pillsbury common stock. O’Hagan realized a profit of
40
over $4 million from these transactions. Since O’Hagan was not
an “insider” of Pillsbury, the corporation in whose shares he traded,
the government proceeded against O’Hagan under the
41
misappropriation theory.
The government claimed that O’Hagan breached a fiduciary
duty to his law firm and Grand Metropolitan when, through his
employment at the law firm, he obtained material, non-public
information concerning Grand Metropolitan’s interest in acquiring
Pillsbury, and subsequently used that information as a basis for
trading in Pillsbury securities. The Supreme Court agreed that the
misappropriation theory is a permissible basis for imposing section
42
10(b) liability.
The O’Hagan Court left open the question of the type of
relationship that creates a fiduciary duty for insider trading
purposes. Presumably, a fiduciary duty often exists between an
employee and an employer, and a professional and a client. It is
not clear whether this duty exists in other relationships, especially
confidential client information to trade in non-client’s stock). See generally
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1 (1993).
36. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993); see also United
States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2001);
37. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
38. Id. at 647.
39. Id. at 647-48.
40. Id. at 648.
41. Id. at 649.
42. Id. at 653.
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non-business relationships, such as between family members or
between friends.
In August 2000, the SEC implemented a new rule addressing
this issue.
The SEC’s new Rule 10b5-2 clarifies how the
misappropriation theory applies to certain non-business
43
relationships. Under this rule, a person receiving confidential
information could be liable under the following circumstances:
a. The person agreed to keep the information confidential;
b. The persons involved in the communication had a pattern
or practice of sharing confidences that resulted in a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality; or
c. The person providing the information was a spouse, parent,
44
child, or sibling of the person receiving the information.
B. Materiality.
Trading on inside information is prohibited only if that
information is material. Theoretically, materiality is determined as
of the time of the trade. Of course, that determination is made
after-the-fact, by a fact-finder with full knowledge of the events
occurring after the trade. It is difficult, as a practical matter, for
that fact-finder not to be influenced by hindsight.
The U. S. Supreme Court has defined materiality as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to [act] . . . . Put another way,
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
45
‘total mix’ of information made available.
At the time of the trade, it may be extremely difficult to
determine whether particular inside information is material. If an
individual makes a trade solely on the basis of that information, it is
fair to assume that the information was material to that individual.
Presumably, under those circumstances, the individual acted on
that information, and considered the information important
enough to rely upon it making an investment. In most cases,
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000).
44. Id.
45. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting the TSC Indus. standard of
materiality for § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
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however, there are myriad reasons why an investor makes an
investment at a particular time.
Because the standard for determining materiality is the
“reasonable shareholder,” materiality is often a fact-bound
determination. Motions for judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgment are rarely granted, and the decision on
materiality is ordinarily reserved for the fact-finder.
Recent cases suggest some guidelines for determining
46
materiality. For example, in Berreman v. West Publishing Co., the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a company’s retention of an
investment banker for purposes of exploring restructuring or
merger alternatives is not material nonpublic information for
47
securities law purposes.
In Berreman, Thomas Berreman, was a long-time West
Publishing Co. employee who owned some of that company’s
48
closely-held common stock. In April 1995, Berreman told West’s
Chief Executive Officer that he intended to retire effective June 1,
49
1995. His last day of work was May 31, 1995, and on June 1, 1995,
Berreman redeemed his 1,600 shares of West common stock at the
50
then-current book value of $2,088.90 per share.
When he redeemed his shares on June 1, 1995, Berreman was
not aware of these events: 1) during the second week of May 1995,
West’s Chief Financial Officer concluded that West should consider
being acquired or enter into a joint venture; 2) on May 17, 1995,
West’s directors met with an investment banking firm to obtain
advice about the company’s future financial options, including a
possible sale of the company, and 3) on May 23, 1995, the West
board authorized its investment bankers to explore financing
51
options beyond West’s local bank. Subsequently, on August 29,
1995, West publicly announced that it had engaged investment
52
bankers and was considering alternative financial options.
In
September 1995, West sent out requests for bids to potential
53
In February, 1996, West entered into a merger
acquirers.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

615 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 375.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 366-67.
Id. at 367.
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54

agreement with Thomson Corporation. In June 1996, Thomson
55
paid $10,445 per share to acquire West.
Based on these facts, Berreman claimed that West and three of
its directors breached fiduciary duties owed to him, and that they
56
committed fraud.
Berreman’s claims required the court to
consider when preliminary merger discussions become “material”
for purposes of fraud. Drawing upon the analysis set forth in Basic
57
Inc. v. Levinson and other federal securities law cases, the court
stated that the test for materiality required a balancing of both the
“indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
58
activity.”
Applying that balancing test, the court held that a
corporate decision to explore restructuring options, including the
possible sale of the company, coupled with the retention of an
59
investment banker, was immaterial as a matter of law.
60
As another example, in SEC v. Thrasher, the court in denying
summary judgment, rejected the defendant’s claim that that he
could not be liable for insider trading on the basis of a false rumor
61
from an unreliable tipper.
The defendant asserted that the
information provided by the tipper proved largely false, and was
inherently immaterial since the tippers were a nightclub promoter
and a male prostitute dying of AIDS, both reputed to be dishonest
62
The SEC responded that the
and desperate for money.
defendant’s behavior - researching and then purchasing the
securities after receiving the information from the purportedly
63
unreliable sources - indicated he did believe them. The Court
noted that “[a] major factor in determining whether information
was material is the importance attached to it by those who knew
64
about it.” Accordingly, the Court determined that a reasonable
65
jury could find that the information was material.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 371.
57. 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988).
58. Berremen, 615 N.W.2d at 371-72 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 238 (1988)).
59. Id. at 373.
60. 152 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
61. Id. at 305.
62. Id. at 299.
63. Id. at 300.
64. Id. (quoting SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997)).
65. Id. at 301.
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C. Non-public Information.
Trading on material, inside information is prohibited only if
that information is truly nonpublic. “To constitute non-public
information under the [1933 Securities Exchange] Act,
information must be specific and more private than general
66
rumor.” There is no securities law violation where “the disclosed
information is so general that the recipient thereof is still
“undertaking a substantial economic risk that his tempting target
67
will prove to be a ‘white elephant.’”
However, an insider’s
confirmation of rumors that a company is in actual merger
discussions, even if no specific details of the merger are provided,
68
constitutes a tip of material non-public information.
D. The Intent to Defraud.
Scienter is a necessary element of a securities fraud violation.
69
Scienter means the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.
Recklessness satisfies this scienter element, but is limited to
those
highly
unreasonable
omissions
or
misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care, and that present a danger
of misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to
the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must
70
have been aware of it.
As a practical matter, concealment by the defendant before
and after the transaction is often the basis for proving scienter. A
defendant who denies or attempts to conceal the existence of
relationships or communications, and especially the fact of a
transaction will find it more difficult to demonstrate good faith and
defend against the claim that his activities were made with the
66. SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1996)).
67. Id. at 52 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
68. Id. (citing United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1996).
69. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
70. K & S P’ship v. Cont’l Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 978 (8th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th
Cir. 1985) (quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981))); see Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc.,
84 F.3d 1525, 1534 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that recklessness satisfies scienter
requirement); SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 508, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that
recklessness satisfies scienter requirement in a civil enforcement action).
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intent to defraud.
E. Causation - the Use and Possession Controversy.
There is a controversy whether Rule 10-5 liability requires
proof of a causal connection between the material inside
information and the insider’s trading. In other words, does insider
trading liability require proof that the trader actually “used”
material nonpublic information in trading or merely that the
trader had “knowing possession” of the information before trading?
71
Some courts have required proof of actual use. At least one
court has adopted the more lenient position promoted by the SEC,
72
and required only proof of knowing possession.
In Adler, the SEC brought a civil action against a corporate
officer of Comptronix Corporation, alleging insider trading and
73
seeking treble damages.
The officer had attended a board
meeting where it was reported that Comptronix anticipated its
largest customer would completely terminate or largely reduce its
74
orders of product. After the meeting, the officer proceeded to
75
sell 20,000 out of his 869,897 shares of stock.
The officer brought a motion for summary judgment, asserting
that he had sold his shares as part of a preexisting plan, not as a
76
result of material non-public information.
He introduced
evidence that he had discussed with his stock broker his plan to sell
the stock before the board meeting, and had also obtained
77
approval for the sale from the company’s general counsel.
In
addition, he sold the stock on the last day of the lockup period for
Comptronix’s initial public offering. The district court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the
officer had rebutted any reasonable inference that he acted with
78
the requisite scienter.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the officer, but rejected the SEC’s argument
that mere possession of non-public information by an insider who
71. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v.
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1998).
72. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993).
73. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1327-32.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1329.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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trades in the company’s stock is sufficient to establish liability
79
The court concluded that the “in
under Section 10(b).
connection with the purchase or sale of a security” requirement of
Section 10(b) “suggests a focus on fraud, deception, and
manipulation” and that the “use standard” “best comports” with
80
this language.
The court reasoned that the “use” test is
appropriate because it is only in trading on the basis of material
nonpublic information that an insider breaches any fiduciary duty
81
and derives personal gain.
The Adler court recognized that it is often difficult to prove
that an insider actually uses material non-public information to
trade. In an effort to alleviate this problem, the court created a
refutable evidentiary presumption that an insider uses material
non-public information when he is in possession of such
82
information and then trades.
Smith came to a similar resolution in an appeal from a criminal
83
conviction in an insider trading case. The appellate issue related
to the adequacy of a jury instruction that the government did not
need to prove that the defendant sold his stock solely because of
material nonpublic information, but rather that such information
was a significant factor in the defendant’s decision to sell. The
Ninth Circuit found the jury instruction to be adequate, but
rejected the government’s “knowing possession” standard and
84
adopted the “use” standard.
In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
focused on the defendant’s use of material non-public information
as a necessary fact to show scienter (This is different than the Adler
court which focused on the defendant’s use of such information as
a necessary fact to show a breach of fiduciary duty). The court
reasoned:
[I]f the insider merely possesses and does not use [the
information], the two parties are trading on a level
playing field . . . both individuals are ‘making their
decisions on the basis of incomplete information.’ It is
the insider’s use, not his possession, that gives rise to an
79. Id. at 1344.
80. Id. at 1332-36.
81. Id.
82. See Id. at 1337 (“[W]hen an insider trades while in possession of material
nonpublic information, a strong inference arises that such information was used
by the insider in trading.”).
83. 155 F.3d 1051.
84. Id. at 1066-69.
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informational advantage and the requisite intent to
85
defraud.
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit declined
to find that an evidentiary presumption exists that an insider uses
material non-public information when he is in possession of such
86
information and then trades.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals came to a contrary
87
decision in United States v. Teicher, in which the court affirmed the
88
convictions of tippee-arbitrageurs who traded after obtaining
misappropriated information about unannounced tender offers
from the associate of a law firm. Although the Second Circuit
accepted the government’s argument that “knowing possession” of
undisclosed material information is sufficient to prove an insider
trading claim, the court’s conclusion is largely dictum because the
facts of the case showed actual use of the misappropriated
information. Indeed, the court found that it was “unnecessary to
determine whether proof of securities fraud requires a causal
89
connection” in light of the evidence presented.
In August 2000, the SEC implemented a new rule addressing
90
91
this issue. The SEC’s new Rule 10b5-1 follows Teicher and adopts
the “possession” standard, and provides that, for purposes of
insider trading, a person trades on the basis of material nonpublic
information if a trader is “aware” of the material nonpublic
92
information when making the purchase or sale.
The rule creates affirmative defenses where it is clear that the
information is not a factor in the decision to trade. Rule 10(b)(5)1(c)(1) provides that a person’s trade is not made on the basis of
material, non-public information if the person can demonstrate
that, prior to becoming aware of that information, the person
made arrangements to trade pursuant to a pre-existing contract,

85. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
86. Compare United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1988) with SEC v.
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
87. 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
88. Arbitrage entails trading in securities in companies that are subject of
changes in corporate control in order to take advantage of fluctuations in the
price of these securities. Id. at 114.
89. Id. at 119.
90. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249
(2000).
91. 987 F.2d 112.
92. 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243 and 249.
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93

instruction or written plan. In order for these affirmative defenses
to be available, the contract, instruction or plan must specify the
amount of securities to be purchased or sold, the price at which the
securities are to be purchased or sold, and the date on which the
94
transaction is to occur.
The other affirmative defense is available only to entities. Rule
10(b)(5)-1(c)(2) provides that an entity’s trade is not made on the
basis of material, non-public information if the entity can
demonstrate that the person making the trade for the entity was
not aware of the information and the entity had established
“reasonable policies and procedures to ensure that the persons
making the buy or sell decisions for it would not violate the laws
prohibiting trading on the basis of material non-public
95
information.”
The SEC has recently published a Telephone Interpretations
Manual with frequently asked questions and answers about this new
96
rule.
III. THE MORALITY OF INSIDER TRADING.
The SEC has long targeted insider trading as a top
enforcement priority. One reason for this focus is the belief that
insider trading destroys the integrity of the capital markets.
There is, however, a contrarian view, that insider trading does
not have a significant, adverse market impact. The contrary
position is that in light of the average trading volume, insider
97
trading has no discernible impact on other investors. Moreover,
the argument is made, insider trading performs a useful function
by preparing the market and getting the market started in the
98
proper direction before the information is publicly announced.
Otherwise, major announcements will cause wide price fluctuations
that not only disrupt an orderly market but will cause more injury
99
to outside investors than would the insider trading.
93. Id. (emphasis in original).
94. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. Id.
of
Publicly
Available
Telephone
Interpretations
at
96. Manual
http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml (last modified July 18, 2001).
97. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); see F.
EASTERBROOK & D. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 251
(1991).
98. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 97, at 251.
99. Id.
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Of course the morality of insider trading does not depend on
the market consequences of the trades but rather on the moral
quality of the actions. Indeed, it has been questioned whether
insider trading should be prohibited, and if so, why: “While its
answer requires more than a response of, ‘Yes, because the practice
is unfair,’ courts, commentators, and the SEC alike have all had
difficulty identifying what harms actually arise from trades based on
100
material nonpublic information.”
There would appear to be at least two legitimate moral
objections to insider trading. First, there is a concern about
fairness - that insider trading provides an unfair information
advantage. As an American Bar Association Task Force concluded:
In our society, we traditionally abhor those who refuse to
play by the rules, that is, the cheaters and the sneaks. A
spitball pitcher, or a card shark with an ace up his sleeve,
may win the game but not our respect. And if we know
such a person is in the game, chances are we won’t play.
These common sense observations suggest that two of the
traditional bases for prohibitions against insider trading
are still sound: the ‘fair play’ and ‘integrity of the markets’
101
arguments.
Second, there is a concern about the use of information
obtained in breach of one’s fiduciary duty. The wrong is the
breach of the fiduciary duty - usually the taking of information
provided for legitimate corporate purposes - and the use of that
information in a secret and deceptive manner for another purpose
– namely, the pecuniary benefit of the person breaching the
102
fiduciary duty.

100. Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading:
Outside The Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 851 (1997).
101. Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on
Regulation of Insider Trading, 41 BUS. LAW 223, 227 (1985).
102. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 917-18 (1961). Indeed, in Cady,
Roberts & Co., the SEC focused on the existence of a relationship providing access
to inside information intended for a corporate purpose, and the inherent
unfairness when a corporate insider takes unfair advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. Id.
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IV. DEFENDING INSIDER TRADING CLAIMS.
A. Reliance on Counsel.
An insider who consults with and relies on the advice of legal
counsel prior to engaging in a trade may use those circumstances
to demonstrate good faith and the lack of scienter. Common sense
dictates that a person who consults with experienced securities
counsel in advance of a trade, explains the relevant background,
and follows counsel’s advice, is acting prudently and without
fraudulent intent.
For example, in In re Digi International, Inc. Securities
103
Litigation, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district
court order granting defendants summary judgment in a class
action alleging securities fraud. The appellate court found that “no
reasonable jury could find the necessary element of scienter,”
reasoning, “[t]he undisputable fact that the Defendants were in
consultations with their outside accountants and legal counsel
during the period in question is in itself evidence which tends to
104
negate a finding of scienter.”
Courts have carefully distinguished between criminal and civil
cases in mapping out the contours of this defense. Thus, although
in a criminal case, good faith reliance on the counsel may rebut a
105
showing of intent, in a civil case, reliance on counsel is “not a
106
complete defense, but only one factor for consideration.”
To rely on this defense, a defendant must prove that he
(1) made complete disclosure to counsel;
(2) sought advice as to the legality of his conduct;
(3) received advice that his conduct was legal; and
107
(4) relied on that advice in good faith.
Merely talking with counsel is not enough. For example, in
Enterprises Solutions, the CEO of a public company failed to disclose
in a registration statement that a prior company he managed had
108
filed for bankruptcy.
He admitted that fact was material, but
103. 14 Fed. Appx. 714, 2001 WL 753869 (8th Cir. July 5, 2001).
104. Id. at 718 (quoting In re Digi Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97-5, slip op. at 15
n.7 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2000) (modification in original)).
105. United States v. Evangelista, 122 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1997).
106. Markowski v. SEC, 34 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1994).
107. SEC v. Enters. Solutions, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 561, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing Markowski, 34 F.3d at 105).
108. Id. at 571.
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contended he disclosed that fact to in-house counsel, and relied on
109
them to include that information in the registration statement.
The court rejected the reliance on counsel defense here, reasoning
that the defense requires “more than simply supplying counsel with
110
information.” The court determined that corporate officers have
an independent duty to insure that material information is
disclosed, and that “[c]ompliance with federal securities laws
cannot be avoided by simply retaining outside counsel to prepare
111
required documents.”
Presumably, courts would come to the
same conclusion in an insider trading case - mere consultation with
counsel would not provide a defense.
Consultation with counsel in advance of a trade is no panacea.
Certainly if counsel provides an unequivocal “green light” to client
contemplating a trade, the client may well be able to rely on such
advice to show good faith and disprove alleged intent to defraud.
But experience suggests that those circumstances are rare. Prudent
counsel in many cases may need to alert clients to the risk that
trading may result in insider trading liability, depending upon a
laundry list of circumstances, or suggest that the conservative
advice is to abstain from the contemplated trades altogether.
Presumably, a lawyer who fails to do so would risk exposure to
malpractice liability if these qualifications and risks were not
provided. Of course, if a client subsequently attempts to rely on
the prior advice of counsel as a defense to insider trading claims,
the attorney-client privilege would be waived, and all the
qualifications or risks addressed by counsel could be used against
the client, and in a devastating manner.
It is not even entirely clear whether the advice of counsel to
engage in the trade - in the event of a subsequent insider trading
prosecution - would remain privileged and confidential regardless
of whether the good faith defense is raised.
In sum, the defense of reliance on counsel may be a
meritorious defense to insider trading liability. Unfortunately for
persons accused of insider trading, as a practical matter the defense
is rarely available.

109.
110.
111.

Id. at 576.
Id. at 571.
Id.
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B. Pre-existing Plans, Contracts or Instructions.
See discussion above.
C. Adherence to Company Plans or Policies.
It is certainly indicative of good faith if an individual openly
and deliberately follows an employer’s insider trading policies. The
1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
(ITSFEA) requires registered brokers, dealers, and investment
advisors to “establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonably designed” to prevent insider trading by their
112
employees. While other employers are not required to maintain
these written policies, they also face increased exposure from the
SEC and private litigants. The new law broadens control person
liability, increasing the economic incentives for such persons to
supervise their employees vigorously.
The SEC has informally suggested that employers, especially
law firms and public companies, adopt appropriate procedures to
prevent unlawful insider trading.
Several provisions of ITSFEA are of special concern to
employees: (1) the SEC can seek civil penalties from an employer
whose personnel are guilty of illegal insider trading if the employee
was reckless; and (2) if an employer failed to take preventive
measures, although otherwise unknowing and innocent, it may be
found reckless.
As an example, a typical insider trading policy may include the
following provisions:
1. Prohibit buying or selling of client securities without
authorization.
2. Prohibit buying or selling of securities on a restricted list
(which may include some non-clients) without authorization.
3. Ban the buying or selling of options based upon client
securities or restricted list securities.
4. Ban short sales of client securities or restricted list securities.
5. Require periodic reporting of purchases and sales.
If an employee follows an employer’s insider trading rules,
this should be one factor showing good faith.

112. Insider Trading & Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680.
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D. Proving Conduct was Legitimate - Rebutting the Circumstantial
Evidence Case.
Most insider trading cases are based on circumstantial rather
than direct evidence, especially with regard to the trader’s intent to
defraud. It is the nature of insider trading that there are rarely
witnesses with first-hand knowledge available, much less writings
that precisely relate what happened and why. Also, persons
deliberately engaging in illegal insider trading often take some
steps to conceal their activities before and after the trades. Insider
trading cases are frequently based entirely on circumstantial
evidence because:
[T]here are generally two people who can provide direct
evidence that insider trading has occurred –- the source of
the information and the trader. It is very rare for one of
these two persons to admit that they have engaged in
insider trading.
Most cases are based largely on
113
circumstantial evidence.
Courts, recognizing this practical reality, are hospitable to
circumstantial cases. It is difficult to obtain dismissal on the
pleadings or summary judgment in insider trading cases because of
this hospitable environment for circumstantial claims, and the factbound nature of the key issues of materiality, the non-public nature
of the information and intent. Accordingly, persons defending
against insider trading claims frequently face the decision of
settling the claims, or litigating the cases at trial.
114
United States v. Larrabee is a good recent example of the
circumstantial evidence case against a legal professional. Larrabee
was employed in the business office of a Boston law firm. He was
responsible for selecting the stockbrokers who placed securities
trades for the trust accounts managed by the firm. Larrabee
developed a personal and financial relationship with D’Angelo, a
115
stock broker at PaineWebber, Inc.
In December 1995, the law firm represented Bank of Boston in
a merger transaction with BayBanks. Larrabee had daily contact
with John Brown, one of the firm’s lawyers involved in the
transaction. On December 12, 1995, Larabee called D’Angelo and

113. Elysian Fed. Sav. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp.
737, 744 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 15 (1988)).
114. 240 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2001).
115. Id. at 19.
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they spoke for about one minute. Thereafter, D’Angelo entered
orders to buy 11,000 shares of BayBanks stock priced at $85 per
share for his own account, for his family members’ account and his
girlfriend’s account. After the market closed that day, Bank of
Boston and BayBanks announced their merger. The next day,
BayBank’s stock price increased by $8 per share before the market
opened. D’Angelo immediately placed orders to sell the stock he
had purchased the evening before, resulting in profits of about
116
$86,750.
A criminal insider trading prosecution ensued against
Larrabee and D’Angelo, and both men were convicted on nine
counts of securities fraud. On appeal, the court found that there
was compelling evidence to support Larrabee’s conviction,
including these factors:
1. Access to information;
2. Relationship between the tipper and tippee;
3. Timing of contact between the tipper and tippee;
4. Timing of the trades;
5. Pattern of the trades; and
6. Attempts to conceal either the trades or the relationship
117
between the tipper and the tippee.
These are similar to the circumstantial factors consistently
relied upon by courts in denying summary judgment motions and
upholding liability determinations.
V. CONCLUSION.
As a very practical matter, defending legal and financial
advisors in these cases requires a concerted effort to prove the
trader’s conduct was legitimate, and, in Emily Dickinson’s
language, to provide a legitimate slant on these same circumstantial
factors. Clear timelines, legitimate business and personal reasons
for the transactions, other sources of information and other
reasons for the transaction, prior investment patterns,
conformance with professional and industry practices,
conformance with statutory and company policies, consultation
with professionals, and the absence of concealment are helpful
elements of such a defense.

116.
117.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 21-22.
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